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Abstract
This contribution focuses on two-party negotiation over continu-
ous issues. We firstly prove two drawbacks of the jointly Improving
Direction Method (IDM), namely that IDM is not a Strategy-Proof
(SP) nor an Information Concealing (IC) method. Thus we prove that
the concurrent lack of these two properties implies the actual non-
efficiency of IDM. Finally we propose a probabilistic method which
is both IC and stochastically SP thus leading to efficient settlements
without being affected by manipulatory behaviors.
Keyword: Two-Party Negotiation, Joint Improving Direction Method, Ma-
nipulatory Behaviour, Efficient Negotiation Models
1 Introduction
To accomplish suitable settlements, several methods have been proposed in
the literature and in practice, in particular the Improving Direction Method
∗E-mail address: luca.barzanti@unibo.it
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(IDM) allows Pareto efficient settlements while negotiating in several contin-
uous contexts. IDM was firstly introduced in Ehtamo et al. [1999] for two-
party negotiation over continuous issues, then generalized in Ehtamo et al.
[2001] to suite multi-party contexts, finally in Ehtamo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen [2001]
is proven its wide generality.
In Section 2 we briefly introduce IDM then in Subsection 2.1 we show
that its deterministic nature constitutes a weakness that can be exploited by
a party against the other thus compromising the optimality of the ending set-
tlement. Finally a probabilistic Non Informative Negotiation (NIN) method
is proposed, in Section 3, so to overcome the IDM’s drawbacks. Conclusions
are expressed in Section 4.
2 Actual Inefficiency of Two-Party Improv-
ing Direction Method
As firstly presented in Ehtamo et al. [1999], IDM is thought in relation
to the concept of single negotiating text (SNT) which was proposed by
R. Fisher during the Camp David negotiations in 1978 (see Fisher [1978],
Fisher and Ury [1987], Raiffa [1982]). Following SNT scheme, IDM iterates
a refinement algorithm into a feasible real domain until the Pareto frontier
is reached.
We are going to recall IDM in the measure it will be useful for what
follows. Thus for a complete description see Ehtamo et al. [1999, 2001],
Ehtamo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen [2001].
Let the negotiation domain D be a convex closed subset of IRn and let u1,
u2 be the utility functions of party 1 and 2 respectively, which are assumed to
be differentiable on D, then we can represent IDM negotiation as a fixed point
algorithm which iterates recursively a map IDM consisting of a neighborhood
exploring step G, that addresses the negotiation in the right direction, which
is followed by a straight going step  L, that aims to exploit the previously
identified direction as far as possible.
More precisely, G(u1, u2, xt) is the bisector of the angle formed by the
gradients of u1(xt) and u2(xt):
G(u1, u2, xt) =
∇u1(xt)
2||∇u1(xt)||
+
∇u2(xt)
2||∇u2(xt)||
. (1)
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Whereas  L is the maximum step that can be done in G(u1, u2, xt) direction
without penalizing any of the parties, thus if λ1 and λ2 are the maximum
movements that party 1 and 2 respectively want to do and λ∗ = min(λ1, λ2)
then,
 L(xt,G(u1, u2, xt)) = xt + λ
∗
t · G(u1, u2, xt). (2)
Note that the algorithm needs an exchange of information between par-
ties and mediator, as authors highlights in Ehtamo et al. [1999], “decision
makers reveal minimal private information to the mediator” which is mostly
represented by the local evaluation of utility gradients.
2.1 Actual Inefficiency of IDM
The deep analysis of actual exchanged information leads us to identify IDM’s
actual weaknesses.
Definition 1. A negotiation method is Strategy-Proof (SP) if and only if
negotiating with the real utility function gains to a party the best ending
settlement, regardless the specific utility profile of the others parties.
Definition 2. A negotiation method is Information-Concealing (IC) if and
only if each party is not able to understand other ones utilities by the medi-
ator announcements.
We prove that IDM fails to be both SP and IC, then its actual inefficiency
as the consequence of the conjunction of these two lacks. Therefore we firstly
need to exhibit an example of negotiation domain within IDM does not hold
any of the two properties.
We are going to use the abstract negotiation domain whose instance
(namely the “fishing right” domain described in [Levhari and Mirman, 1980])
was used in Ehtamo et al. [1999, 2001], Ehtamo and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen [2001] as
the example of IDM effectiveness. Let us, thus, consider for k ≥ 0, the
triangular domain
D = {(x1, x2) ∈ IR
2 | x1, x2 ≥ 0 ∧ x1 + x2 ≤ k},
and the class of utility functions
U = {u : D → IR | u = α1 log(x1)+α2 log(x2)+α3 log(k−x1−x2)∧αi ≥ 0}.
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Let us now assume that there is perfect competition between the two negoti-
ating parties P1 and P2, thus the first one has utility u1 ∈ U with parameters
(1, 0, β1) while the latter has utility u2 ∈ U with parameters (0, 1, β2).
Within this domain, the points B1 ≡ (k/(1 + β1), 0) and B2 ≡ (0, k/(1 +
β2)) correspond to the best utility of P1 and P2 respectively, while the Pareto
efficient frontier F associated to u1 and u2 is the line segment B1B2. Thus
according to its optimality, for any x0 ∈ D, IDM converges on a point
IDM(u1, u2, x0) ∈ F . Moreover we know by the characterization of the
efficient frontier that, for all x ∈ F , ∇ui(x) ‖ ∂F(x).
Theorem 1. IDM is not SP.
Proof. Let us suppose by absurd that IDM is SP, thus for all γ ≥ 0, if
vγ = log(x1) + γ log(k − x1 − x2) then, by looking at P1,
u1(IDM(vγ , u2, x0)) ≤ u1(IDM(u1, u2, x0)), (3)
where the equality corresponds to the choice γ = β1. In particular by fixing
k = 10, maximum utility of P1 in (2, 0), of P2 in (0, 3) and starting by
x0 ≡ (5, 4) the negotiation sops on the Paretian at x¯ ≡ (1.1410, 1.2884) and
gaining P1 an ending utility of u1(x¯) = 8.2290. Under the same assumptions if
P1 declares v7/3 6= u1(= v4) then the negotiation ends in x
′ ≡ (1.7435, 1.2565)
corresponding to an ending utility u1(x
′) = 8.3395 > u1(x¯) which contradicts
the hypothesis.
Theorem 2. IDM is not IC.
Proof. Within the same negotiation domain used in the proof of Theorem 1
once, without loss of generality, P1 observes the announced G(u1, u2, x0), he
can calculate
v ≡
∇u2(x0)
||∇u2(x0)||
= 2G(u1, u2, x0)−
∇u1(x0)
||∇u1(x0)||
by inverting equation 1. Knowing v, P1 can find the parameter β2 which
characterizes u2 by solving (∇u2(x0), (v2, v1)) = 0 which is linear in β2.
Note that if the estimation of more than one parameter is needed, then
P1 can slow the IDM convergence as down as he wants by simply declaring
in the  L stage a λ1 step sufficiently small, thus he can collect all the ∇u2
samples he needs to uniquely understand u2.
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Theorem 3. IDM is actual inefficient when there is a one to one correspon-
dence between utility profiles and Pareto frontiers.
Proof. Each party can exploit the IDM’s lack of IC to retrieve other one
utility and to take advantage of IDM’s lack of SP, so if u11 and u
1
2 are the
parties true utilities while u21 and u
2
2 are the strategical utilities, then there
are four possible ending settlements, according to Pi using u
1
i or u
2
i , each of
them on a different Pareto efficient frontier Fuj
1
,uk
2
. By construction of both
u21 and u
2
2, it results that u
1
1(IDM(u
2
1, u
1
2, x0)) > u
1
1(IDM(u
1
1, u
1
2, x0)) and
u12(IDM(u
1
1, U
2
2 , x0)) > u
1
2(IDM(u
1
1, u
1
2, x0)).
The last two inequalities suffice to say that for both P1 and P2 the ac-
tion of using their own real utility function is not a dominant strategy, thus
IDM(u11, u
1
2, x0) is not the solution of the non cooperative strategic form
game associated to the outcomes. Moreover whenever a change of utility
function corresponds to a change of the Pareto efficient frontier, like in the
presented negotiation domain, IDM results actual inefficient in consequence
of the fact that if (j, k) 6≡ (1, 1) then IDM(uj1, u
k
2, x0) /∈ Fu1
1
,u1
2
.
Figure 1 shows IDM lacks in the triangular domain used in the proof of
Theorem 1. The four trajectories correspond (from left to right and from the
top to the bottom) to (u11, u
2
2), (u
2
1, u
2
2), (u
1
1, u
1
2) and (u
2
1, u
1
2). Inefficiency is
then confirmed by looking at the strategic form game associated to the ending
utilities which is equivalent to the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, whose dominant
strategy solution (u21, u
2
2) is well-known suboptimal.
3 Two-Party Negotiation Method Secure
Against Manipulatory Behavior.
In this Section we propose a probabilistic Non Informative Negotiation method
(NIN) that follows the SNT scheme but it avoids mutual information leaks.
Hence NIN is a fixed point algorithm whose iterated map NIN : D → D is
composed, like IDM’s one, by a neighborhood exploring step G and a straight
going step  L but, differently from IDM, G is based on stochastic answers.
Thereby step by step, each party Pi chooses a random vector vi which is
picked according to a secret probability distribution with mean ∇ui(xt), then
G is computed as the bisector of the two randomly chosen directions rather
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than gradients
G(xt) =
v1
2||v1||
+
v1
2||v2||
. (4)
Due to the stochastic nature of parties answers, the condition NIN(xt) =
xt does not guarantee that xt is on the Pareto frontier F . Nevertheless the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 4. If x is on the Pareto frontier F of u1 and u2 then
P (NIN(x) = x) = 1,
independently of the secret probability functions µ1 and µ2 of P1 and P2 re-
spectively.
Proof. From the characterization of F follows that a movement in the direc-
tion d, for any d ∈ IR2, penalizes at least one party, e.g. P1. Thus P1 would
declare at the  L step λ1 = 0 if the direction is d. Thus by the arbitrary of d
follows that NIN(x) = x always on F .
Proposition 4 can be used to draw the NIN stop condition, i.e. to fix
a maximum number M of consecutive tries to find a new settlement point
above which the negotiation is ended. In particular the following proposition
leads to NIN ’s stochastic efficiency.
Proposition 5. The probability to stop NIN negotiation earlier that reach-
ing the Pareto frontier decays to zero exponentially on M .
Proof. Regardless the actual sub optimal settlement x ∈ D, if the probability
to have G(x) in the feasible region of x is ǫ then the probability to fail M in
a row tries to improve x is exactly (1− ǫ)M .
The NIN method can be summarized as it follows:
1. Start at the pre-agreed settlement x0 and set t = 0;
2. r ← 0;
3. while r < M do
(a) if NIN(xt) 6= xt then
i. xt+1 ← NIN(xt);
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ii. t← t+ 1;
iii. r ← 0;
(b) else
i. r ← r + 1;
4. return x∗ ≡ xt.
Note that the “noise” introduced by the stochastic component of NIN
makes both useless the a priori mutual knowledge and impossible the process
of deterministically retrieve the other one utility function. Nevertheless an
adequate choice of the stopping bound M leads exponentially close to the
Pareto frontier as can be seen in Figure 2, where the Mean Relative Error
MRE =
n∑
i=1
d(F , NIN(u1, u2, x0))
n · d(F , x0)
(5)
is plotted varyingM , and in Figure 3 where the Relative Error frequencies are
sampled for the first values of M . In particular the exponentially decreasing
shape of both figures reflects the Proposition 5 and for M as little as 5 the
MRE is 0.0161 meaning that NIN reduced the starting distance at the 1.61%
of the original one. Moreover for any M ≥ 1 NIN ends closer to F than any
strategical path of IDM; Figure 4 shows by means of 10 random samples how
NIN ends very close to the Pareto frontier, when M = 5.
4 Conclusion
In this contribution we highlighted two main drawbacks of the IDM negoti-
ation method which affect its global efficiency, namely that IDM is sensible
to information of other party utility and that IDM itself conveys mutual
knowledge. We then proposed a probabilistic method that overcomes these
practical limitations without loosing the efficiency of the ending settlement.
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Figure 1: Example of IDM inefficiency. The thicker trajectory corresponds
to {u21, u
2
2} ≡ (8.0642, 4.9368), i.e. the dominant strategy solutions of the
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” like strategic form game, which results by looking at
the payoffs table.
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Figure 3: Relative Error frequencies for different values of M over 500 sam-
ples.
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Figure 4: 10 NIN trajectories with M = 5 in the same example of Figure 1.
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